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Abstract: Does culture matter in decision-making? Existing literature largely assumes that 
the cognitive processes that inform decision-making are universally applicable, while only 
very few studies indicate that cultural norms and values shape cognitive processes. Using 
survey based quasi-experimental design, this research shows that subjects with higher 
levels of individualism tend to be more rational in their decision processing, while those 
with higher levels of collectivism tend to be more dependent and less likely to betray the 
interests of members of more central ingroups in favor of less central ingroups. Furthermore, 
the results indicate that in conflict settings that seem familiar, individuals are more likely to 
compromise in order to achieve peace. 
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1. Introduction 
In August of 2012, Erick Barrondo became Guatemala’s first ever Olympic medal winner. After 
finishing second in the men’s twenty kilometer walk race, Barrondo said, “It’s well known that 
Guatemala has problems with guns and knives. I hope that this medal inspires the kids at home to put 
down guns and knives and pick up a pair of trainers instead” [1]. Even today, Guatemala feels the 
effects of its 36-year civil war that ended in 1996, as individuals throughout the country make 
decisions regularly on whether to cooperate or fight, and whether to pursue peaceful activities or use 
violence. The country’s history of armed conflict and polarized politics created a complex social 
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environment prompting the presence of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation, MINUGUA, 
for ten years ending in 2004. In its final report on the mission, the UN noted that “the most difficult 
challenge for MINUGUA was to operate in the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multilingual 
environment of Guatemala” [2]. This raises the question of how significant the impact of culture is on 
the decisions made not only by deployed peacekeeping troops, but also by the individuals living in the 
conflict society [3]. Decision-making as an activity is considered to be a rational universal practice in 
human behavior, as people of all cultures have problems and opportunities that require making choices 
from among alternatives. Most research studies presume that the cognitive processing behind decision 
making is also universal, although a small set of literature suggests that cultural variation does make a 
difference in cognitive processes [4]. If the argument for cultural variation can be more fully 
supported, particularly in the context of conflict, then culturally-relevant constraints in decision-making 
environments become more applicable to models of decision processing and conflict prevention. 
The main research question of this study is: how do cultural norms and values affect decision-making 
in conflict situations? Using a comparative case study, we examined cross-country differences in 
decision-making processes between sample populations in the U.S. and Ghana. We selected these two 
countries based on significant cultural differences, with the U.S. being highly individualist and Ghana 
being highly collectivist [5]. The design of our study centered on a survey that examined key 
individual attributes such as individualism-collectivism and styles of decision making in response to a 
quasi-experimental decision scenario presented to a sample of university students from each country.  
The article is divided into four main sections. The first section provides a review of the current 
literature on conflict theory, decision theory, culture, and group identity. The second section presents a 
theoretical framework and develops a set of testable hypotheses. The third section provides a 
discussion of the methodology and data collection techniques and the fourth section presents our 
findings and some preliminary suggestions for future research. 
2. Decision-Making in Conflict 
In this section, we review relevant literature from conflict resolution theory, decision theory, 
cultural dimensions, and group identity in an attempt to systematically explore the impact of cultural 
dimensions on decision-making processes, especially in the context of conflict resolution  
and transformation. 
2.1. Conflict Resolution Theory 
Conflict resolution emerged as a field of study in the 1950s and 1960s when a group of scholars 
began to develop specific approaches and techniques for analyzing the cultural generalizability of 
conflict resolution [6]. Early theorists in the field of conflict resolution did not find cultural variation to 
be particularly relevant. For example, Burton and Sandole characterized conflict resolution approaches 
as generic, based on universal behaviors thought to transcend cultural differences, because the root of 
conflict was seen not through the impact of social institutions and cultural values, but rather through 
the drive to satisfy basic human needs [7]. Anthropologists such as Avruch and Black brought 
increased awareness to the culture question, challenging some of the assumptions made about the 
universality of human nature. Avruch and Black introduced the notion of ethnoconflict theory which 
Societies 2013, 3 130 
 
precedes discussion of interests, needs, and values in the analysis of conflict by focusing on the 
implicit knowledge contained within a culture that is often taken for granted and may rarely be 
verbalized [8]. They refer to this knowledge as “local common sense”. The importance of cultural 
relevance to conflict resolution theory emerged partly as a result of specific case studies that 
demonstrated the ineffectiveness of taking North American-based conflict resolution techniques and 
trying to transfer them to other parts of the world without accounting for local common sense [9,10].  
Conflict resolution techniques often involve various aspects of negotiation, and in the study of 
negotiation processes, we find that cultural variation becomes apparent while building relationships, 
communicating, setting goals, and reaching agreements [11]. Cohen considered negotiations to be a 
special case of communications, with all the inherent traps of misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations [12]. In international negotiations, the potential for miscommunication is 
characteristic of intercultural interaction in general, for in order to have true communication, the 
parties must have a common base of semantic assumptions. People who have no shared experience or 
common history have no guarantee that the intended meaning by the sender is decoded correctly by the 
receiver. In this sense, culture becomes a key variable when people from different cultures interact.  
Although there are differences of opinion on the relevance of culture to conflict resolution, the field 
has evolved to a point where culture is considered to be an important factor in settings of interactive 
conflict resolution. However, just how does culture factor in, and how does it affect the individual 
level, shaping how people make personal decisions about whether to participate in conflict escalation 
or resolution activities? 
2.2. Decision Theory 
How do people go about making a decision? In particular, we are interested in how people make 
decisions when faced with a situation of conflict. We briefly review four types of decision theory.  
2.2.1. Theories of Rationality 
The rational choice theory was the dominant paradigm in decision making from World War II until 
the late twentieth century. Rational choice theory makes three broad assumptions: actors know what 
they want, are able to order their wants, and will choose the best means to reach their desired ends [13]. 
For instance, in expected utility theory, different people attribute different value to risk, so each seeks 
to maximize their own “expected utility” rather than maximizing an overall “expected value” that is 
mathematically calculated [14]. In other words, people make a rational choice by analyzing the costs, 
benefits, and risks and seeking to optimize their outcome based on their own preference for risk.  
One flaw in any rational approach is the assumption that people have perfect information and the 
perfect ability to calculate all the costs and benefits before making a decision [15]. In order to 
accommodate the more imperfect real world, Simon introduced his famous satisficing theory to 
include shortcuts in the optimization process [16], allowing individuals to set a threshold and accept 
the first choice that crosses their threshold, leaving the rest of the alternatives without analysis.  
Some scholars believe that rationality provides the only scientific approach to social theory [13]. 
Theories of rationality do simplify or generalize the problem at hand, and generalization is seen to be 
of great value because it allows for prediction. However, critics of the rational choice approach argue 
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that it is inherently inconsistent with observed human behavior [17–20]. For example, more lottery 
tickets are sold as the size of the prize increases, indicating that the size of the jackpot is more 
important to players than the probability of actually winning [21]. 
2.2.2. Theories of Emotion 
Although much of the criticism against rational choice stems from cognitive theory (described in 
the next section), there are a few emotion-based decision factors worth mentioning. The concept of 
affect in decision-making is one that arises when emotions such as fear are particularly strong. Affect 
enables a person to make decisions quickly in the face of danger, but can also cloud judgment [15]. 
Gordon and Arian studied the relationship between feelings of threat and decision processing from 
data on the Arab/Israeli conflict as well as local U.S. conflict situations such as neighborhood crime [22]. 
They found that when people felt threatened, their decision process was dominated by emotion, not 
logic or rational considerations. Their findings showed that the stronger the level of threat, the more 
belligerent the policy choice; the lower the level of threat, the more pacific the policy choice. They 
argued that even though logic has as role in decision-making, much of the process is driven by emotion.  
2.2.3. Theories of Cognition 
Observation has shown that people often make choices that are not rational, and many social 
scientists have pursued an explanation for this unpredictable behavior via a cognitive approach. 
Cognitive approaches focus on human processing of information, including how individuals gather 
information and then use it to evaluate situations [23]. This approach has led to a model of human 
behavior broadly referred to as “behavioral decision theory”, which shows that people use cognitive 
shortcuts and preferences when processing information, deviating predictably from rational choice 
theories [18].  
Kahneman and Tversky researched why people seem to exhibit inconsistent behavior when making 
decisions in risky situations and published their ground-breaking research on prospect theory in 1979 [19]. 
In prospect theory, the objects of choice are prospects with value assigned in terms of gains and losses, 
rather than final outcomes. People react differently depending on how the situation is presented in 
terms of those gains and losses. Underlying the work on prospect theory are the concepts of heuristics 
and biases. Heuristics are essentially cognitive shortcuts, which reduce complex tasks to simpler 
operations of judgment. Judgmental heuristics, however, can introduce error and lead to suboptimal 
outcomes [18,23–25]. These errors are usually referred to as biases, which can vary depending on the 
heuristic being used. Three commonly discussed heuristics are: availability, representativeness, and 
adjustment and anchoring. The availability heuristic is based on information that is most accessible to 
a person or occurrences that can be most easily brought to mind. In the representativeness heuristic, 
others are grouped into types with assumed similarity of characteristics, as in stereotypes. Using the 
adjustment and anchoring heuristic means starting from an initial value that is known and making 
adjustments from there based on the current situation [25]. There are many other heuristics that have 
been identified in political science and psychological literature, with more than fifty distinct heuristics 
named [26]. The danger of this seemingly endless proliferation of heuristics is that keeping track of 
them all and discovering how individuals coordinate these multiple judgment strategies becomes 
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overwhelmingly complex. A more productive approach would be to focus on the cognitive processes 
behind the decisions rather than on the individual heuristics themselves. 
There are varied examples in the literature of how social scientists have applied aspects of cognitive 
theory to specific situations. The application of the cognitive approach to domestic politics and voting 
practices is the most prevalent [26,27]. Other applications include understanding how heuristics are 
used by political elites [23] and security policy makers [24]. The application of heuristics to decision 
making in situations of conflict has been studied only infrequently. 
2.2.4. Blended Theories 
One can imagine various ways to combine theories of rationality, emotion, and cognition, but there 
is one particular blended approach that has received the most attention in the literature: poliheuristic 
theory. Poliheuristic theory offers an alternative to the traditional rational actor model by integrating 
aspects of both the cognitive and rational approaches to decision-making. Poliheuristic theory is 
conceptualized as a two-stage decision process. The first stage is a cognitive process, which screens 
the possible alternatives and narrows the choices by eliminating options based on one or more 
heuristics. In the second stage, the remaining alternatives are then evaluated in a rational way in order 
to minimize risk and maximize benefit [28–30]. Poliheuristic theory has made important contributions 
to understanding the decision making process in the realm of foreign policy [31], but its application to 
other types of decisions made by individuals and groups has been limited [29].  
2.3. Cultural Dimensions 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to a 
nationality,” but what determines nationality? Is it culture? From a legal point of view, nationality is 
about reflecting an individual’s genuine link with a country, based on objective factors such as place of 
birth, descent, and residency [32]. On the other hand, culture, even though it is often associated with a 
country, is more difficult to define and measure [33]. One common definition of culture is based on the 
anthropological conception of a learned system of meanings rooted in symbols and language that allow 
people to adapt to their environment and interpret their experiences [34]. Hofstede’s 1980 study 
defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one 
human group from another” [35]. 
In attempts to understand and categorize national cultures, a number of scholars have narrowed 
their focus to the study of values. Values are principles that give order and guidance to people in their 
thoughts and actions as they face common human problems and issues [36]. By observing the 
principles that different social groups use in their thoughts and actions, researchers have been able to 
infer the values shared by various social groups. Societies can then be categorized and compared based 
on commonly shared values. In 2008, Thomas reviewed the five major frameworks that have emerged 
out of these value studies, each allowing for the categorization and comparison of national cultures: the 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck framework, Hofstede’s model, the Schwartz Value Survey, Trompennars’s 
value dimensions, and the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) 
study [37]. Each of these five studies categorized culture in terms of value measurements, deriving a 
set of four to nine dimensions depending on the framework. The only dimension to appear in all five 
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values studies is the individualism-collectivism dimension. The individualism-collectivism dimension 
has been used extensively in the study of social behaviors, especially in efforts to predict behavioral 
patterns [37–40]. For example, conducting a meta-analysis of 253 studies on individualism-collectivism, 
Osyerman et al. concluded that the individualism-collectivism construct does impact basic psychological 
processing, and that cultural differences in the dimension “provide a powerful explanatory tool for 
understanding the variability in the behavior of individuals in different parts of the world” [39].  
The term individualism is used to define the degree to which members of society define their self-image 
as an individual or as part of a larger group. On the other hand, those who define themselves from the 
social and collective aspects of the self-concept are described with the term collectivism. Individualism 
and collectivism are sometimes seen as opposite ends of a single continuum, but it is more accurate to 
describe them as worldviews that make different aspects of the self-concept salient. The core elements 
of individualism are independence and uniqueness, whereas the core elements of collectivism are duty 
to in-group and maintaining harmony. Triandis writes about the prototypical social relationships that 
describe each of these two constructs [41]. For collectivism, the prototypical relationship is the family. 
The family cares for its members and cooperates together, often acting as a single unit with common 
goals. Each member of the family has a well-defined role and status determined by position within the 
group. Family members have strong emotional ties to one another and are linked typically for life. For 
individualism, the prototypical relationship is the marketplace where an individual makes a payment 
and receives a good or service in return. The relationships are emotionally distant and although 
members of the market interact frequently, each member maintains his or her own distinct identity. 
The marketplace encourages competition, and status is usually determined by individual achievement 
and success and not by membership in a particular group. 
The individualism-collectivism construct is useful as a mechanism for systematically describing 
ways in which cultures differ. The construct is helpful for understanding how culture influences  
not only what people think but also how they think. How could the measured difference in 
individualism-collectivism play out in terms of decision making? Chen and Li explored cultural 
differences of decision-making between individualist and collectivist societies by looking at Chinese 
(collectivist) versus Australian (individualistic) cultures [42]. They found that the Chinese were less 
cooperative with foreigners than with Chinese, whereas Australians were equally cooperative with 
members of either group. However, such research studies into the cultural impacts on decision making 
are rare and there are many unresolved and unanswered questions in this area. Do individualist and 
collectivist cultures differ in the values they apply to decisions made in the face of conflict? Do such 
differences enhance or aggravate peacekeeping efforts that are initiated in conflict prone zones? Can 
peacekeeping personnel be trained to manage cultural differences and achieve peace more efficiently? 
There is a need for further research to gain an improved understanding of how cultural differences 
manifest themselves in the decision making process, particularly in conflict contexts. The well-
established differences in the individualism-collectivism dimension between the two countries make 
the U.S. and Ghana an excellent test case for a cross-country comparative study on culture and its 
impact on decision-making. 
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2.4. Social/Group Identity 
Most generally, identity represents “the process by which the person seeks to integrate his (sic) 
various statuses and roles, as well as his diverse experiences, into a coherent image of self” [43]. 
Individuals draw on multiple, sometimes even competing subidentities (e.g., religious, political, social, 
ethnic, or occupational) to derive their self-conceptions. These subidentities become consequential for 
behavior in situations when their salience is invoked [44]. A person’s various subidentities form 
specific links between the self and his or her membership in social groups. Hofman specified salience 
as the probability by which a subidentity is remembered and activated in a given context [45]. 
Prolonged salience upgrades the subidentity in the “prominence hierarchy” thereby enhancing its 
“centrality” and the degree to which it connects with other subidentities. The more central a 
subidentity is to an individual’s self-conception and the more interconnected it is with other 
subidentities, the more committed the individual will be to preserving and enhancing that identity and 
to display attitudes, values, and social behaviors consistent with it.  
In the present context, the concept of “social identity” refers to “that part of individuals’ self 
concept which derives from knowledge of their membership in a social group (or groups) together with 
the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” [46]. Theories of social identity are 
typically based on three premises:  
(1) people are motivated to create and maintain a positive self-concept;  
(2) the self-concept derives largely from group identifications; and  
(3) people establish positive social identities through normative comparisons between favorable in-groups 
and unfavorable out-groups [47].  
Social identity research has demonstrated that individuals tend to invoke their group identifications 
in many decision contexts, since the norms, values, stereotypes and behavior patterns associated with a 
particular identity provide a sense of certainty and may inform their choice among decision 
alternatives [48–54]. 
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
The main research question of this study asks with regard to cultural variation: (1) how are 
decisions made (the decision-making process), and (2) what are the actual decisions (the decision-making 
outcome). We operationalized the decision-making process using the scale developed by Spicer & 
Adler-Smith which identifies a self-reported general decision making style (GDMS) falling into one of 
five categories: rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant, or spontaneous [55]. A rational style is a 
logical and structured approach to decision making. An intuitive style relies upon hunches, feelings 
and impressions. A dependent style relies upon the direction and support of others. An avoidant style 
tends to postpone or avoid making decisions. In addition, a spontaneous style is impulsive and prone to 
making spur of the moment decisions.  
The independent variable, “cultural norms and values”, was measured analyzing: (1) the cultural 
traits of the individual decision maker, (2) the society that the individual lives in, and (3) the cultural 
context of the conflict setting. Recognizing that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions of decision-making 
operate at the country level and variation occurs across people within each country, we measured the 
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cultural traits of the decision maker by employing the Auckland Individualism Collectivism Scale 
(AICS) [56]. Individualists are those that exhibit traits of uniqueness, responsibility, and 
competitiveness, while collectivists seek advice and harmony.  
To measure societal aspects, we collected data using survey-based quasi-experimental design at an 
American university and compared results to data collected at a university in Ghana, The cultural 
dimensions of these two countries vary across Hofstede’s measures, as shown in Figure 1, with the 
most marked difference seen in the individualism-collectivism score [5]. Even if individuals within a 
country do not align with Hofstede’s dimensions for that country, we anticipated that living in a 
society with particular cultural dimensions would affect how the individual behaved. 
Figure 1. Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions for the U.S. and Ghana.  
 
Source: The Hofstede Center 2012 [5]. 
For the final cultural aspect, the setting of a particular conflict scenario was varied randomly 
between two descriptions that differed distinctly in the individualist/collectivist nature of the groups 
involved. The conflict scenario was written as a short fictional vignette depicting a mining operation 
under protest. Participants were asked to take on a specific role within the vignette and make decisions 
that would potentially affect themselves and the various groups to which they belonged (see below for 
a more detailed description of the scenario). The vignette itself was designed to make salient different 
layers of social identity, as shown in Figure 2. Both versions of the vignette followed this layered 
model. The key difference between the versions was in the description of the overall community—
individualist versus collectivist—and reference to friends and family. 
We hypothesized that each of the three aspects of culture would impact decision making. First, the 
individualist-collectivist nature of a person should affect their decision-making style. The desire for 
uniqueness and the competitive drive are likely to reflect a more rational decision making style, while 
the desire for harmony and the drive to seek advice from others are likely to result in a more dependent 
decision making style for collectivists. We tested the following hypotheses: 
H1: Individuals with more individualist traits are more rational in their decision-making.  
H2: Individuals with more collectivist traits are more dependent in their decision-making.  
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With regard to the second cultural aspect, society, we hypothesized that people living in a more 
collectivist society (Ghana over the U.S.) would be more likely to prioritize the needs and interests of 
their more central ingroups, namely those identity groups that are at more salient at the inner layers.  
H3: Individuals from a more collectivist society are more likely to prioritize the interests of 
members of social groups that are closer to the core of their salient identities. 
We also anticipated an effect of the cultural setting of the scenario, expecting that when decision 
makers were presented with a conflict scenario in a cultural setting that did not align with their own 
cultural experiences, their style of decision-making would adjust and become more avoidant. 
Additionally, we expected that when decision makers were presented with a scenario in a cultural 
setting that generally felt similar to their own social surroundings, their decisions would more often 
lean toward cooperation and the pursuit of peace, rather than continued protests. This type of effect can 
be considered a “representativeness” heuristic where the opposition is judged to be more trustworthy 
because they represent something more familiar. 
H4a: The more individualistic a person is, the more avoidant his/her decision-making style will 
become in collectivist contexts. 
H4b: The more collectivist a person is, the more avoidant his/her decision-making style will 
become in individualist contexts. 
H5: When the setting of the story assimilates one’s own cultural context, decision makers more 
often choose to cooperate and achieve peace, than resist and continue protesting. 
Figure 2. Layers of Group Identity in the Vignette. 
 
4. Methods and Data 
Data was collected from 469 undergraduate students across two universities: Kennesaw State 
University (KSU) located in Kennesaw, Georgia where 265 respondents participated through an  
on-line survey system implemented through introductory psychology classes, and the University of 
Societies 2013, 3 137 
 
Cape Coast (UCC) in Ghana, where 204 participants completed a paper survey. UCC participants 
came from three classes: 84 participants from an introductory level history class; 67 participants from 
a junior level sociology class; and 53 students from a senior level business class. The resulting samples 
from KSU and UCC were compared on key demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, religion, 
ethnicity, major, and country of origin, indicating that both samples were similar in terms of age, 
percent native born, religion, and distribution of ethnicities with one dominant ethnicity and one 
secondary ethnicity. The largest demographic difference was in terms of gender, where KSU had an 
unusually high participation of females, much higher than the university average.  
Selecting our sample from student populations presents a well-recognized limitation to the 
generalizability of our findings, because college students are not representative of society or the public 
at large. However, the primary goal of this experiment is not to generalize to society, but to test for the 
impact of culture on decision-making in a laboratory-like setting, controlling as much as possible for 
other, non-cultural, decision factors [57]. Surveying student participants is justified by the fact that 
they represent likely future leaders [58], a population of interest as exemplar carriers of social identity 
and values and, as such, a valid target group for research into the cultural dynamics of local conflict 
and its resolution and/or transformation.  
Employing the quasi-experiment previously described, participants were randomly assigned one of 
two versions of the story: one set in an individualistic culture and the other set in a collectivist culture. 
Prior to being presented with the vignette, participants were asked to complete the AICS instrument to 
determine their individualism-collectivism traits, and the GDMS instrument to determine the general 
decision making style. After reading the vignette, participants were presented with two decisions to 
make. The first decision was whether to reveal fellow protest members who were dangerously 
sabotaging the mine, and the second decision was whether to take an offer from the company CEO that 
would provide additional benefits to the protest group, but not all the miners. Each of these decisions 
was presented as a binary choice. Finally, the GDMS instrument was administered again in modified 
form, with references to the particular decision just made in order to assess the extent to which their 
decision was affected by type of setting/cultural context. The flow of the experiment is represented in 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Experimental Design. 
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The AICS instrument consisted of 26 items measuring traits divided between individualism and 
collectivism that had been previously validated and shown to be reliable with α > 0.70 [59]. Responses 
were given on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Based on 
participant feedback from a pretest conducted earlier, the most repetitive questions in the survey were 
removed, resulting in 14-item instrument with a slightly reduced reliability of α > 0.67. See Appendix 
A for the 14-item question set. The GDMS instrument consisted of 25 items with five items identified for 
each of the five decision-making styles and a previous validation shown to be reliable with α > 0.67 [55]. 
Again based on participant feedback from the earlier pretest, the most repetitive questions in the 
survey were removed, resulting in 17-item instrument with a slightly reduced reliability of α > 0.64. 
See Appendix B for this 17-item question set.  
5. Findings 
We tested the first two hypotheses using regression analysis. H1 anticipates a positive relationship 
between individualism and rational decision making, and this was reflected in the results. The 
correlation between the rational decision-making style and individualism was statistically significant 
(p < 0.05), remaining so when controlled by age, gender, country, and religion1. Another factor that 
emerged as significant was the country location, with participants from the U.S. being less rational, 
whereas those from Ghana being more rational. H2 anticipates a correlation between dependent 
decision making and collectivism, as reflected by the negative sign on the individualism coefficient 
(see Table 1). The correlation between a dependent decision-making style and collectivism was 
significant (p < 0.01), remaining so when controlling for age, gender, country, and religion. The 
coefficient for individualism-collectivism was small and again country location emerged as a 
significant factor with a larger coefficient value indicating that those from the U.S. were less 
dependent and those from Ghana tended to be more dependent. No issues of heteroskedasticity were 
present in the models. Adjusted R-squared was 4% and 5% for the rational and dependent models 
respectively, with statistical significance for the F-stat of both, indicating robust models. Overall, our 
statistical analysis showed support for both H1 and H2, revealing significant relationships between 
individualism and rational decision-making (H1), and collectivism and dependent decision-making 
(H2). The small coefficients and low R-squared values suggest, however, that individualism-collectivism 
traits are only a small part of the decision-making equation. Tables 1 and 2 show a summary of the results. 
H3 anticipates that in a more collectivist society (Ghana), decision makers will prioritize interest of 
members of more central ingroups over those of less central ingroups. This hypothesis was tested via 
the first decision made after reading the vignette. In this case, the participants must decide whether to 
reveal the names of the people sabotaging the mine (the inner group circle of protestors) to the head of 
the mining company (the most outer group circle, see Figure 2). Revealing their names could get the 
people into trouble with the law or cause them to lose their jobs. However, not revealing their names 
puts all the miners in physical danger (the group circle between the other two layers), and puts the 
company at risk (the most outer group circle). There were many factors for participants to consider, 
and the dilemma had no straightforward or obvious answer, but a general indicator of prioritizing inner 
                                                            
1 Due to the dominance of the Christian religion in both samples (93% in Ghana and 77% in the U.S.), we controlled for 
religion as a dummy variable of Christian or not-Christian.  
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group circle interests should show in the decision not to reveal the names. We therefore hypothesized 
that participants from the U.S. were more likely to reveal the names, and participants from Ghana were 
less likely to reveal the names. The results of our logistic regression did support this hypothesis when 
controlling for age, gender, and religion (p < 0.05). Gender also emerged as a significant factor (p < 0.05), 
with men more often deciding to reveal the names. See Table 3 for the results. 
Table 1. OLS Regression Results for Rational Decision-Making Style. 
DV=Rational I II III IV V 
Individualism 
(variable of interest) 
0.108 
(0.028) ** 
0.122 
(0.012) ** 
0.121 
(0.013) ** 
0.103 
(0.034) ** 
0.110 
(0.026) ** 
Age 
  
−0.325 
(0.128) 
−0.325 
(0.129) 
−0.380 
(0.075) * 
−0.391 
(0.065) * 
GenderMale  
   
−0.463 
(0.853) 
−2.475 
(0.338) 
−1.858 
(0.472) 
USParticipant  
    
−7.087 
(0.004) *** 
−5.750 
(0.023) ** 
ReligionChristian 
     
7.218 
(0.025) ** 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.008 0.013 0.011 0.028 0.037 
F-Stat 
 
4.867 
(0.028) ** 
3.872 
(0.022) ** 
2.561 
(0.054) * 
4.035 
(0.003) *** 
4.268 
(0.001) *** 
N 469 425 424 424 424 
P-value in parentheses; *** = significant at 0.01; ** = significant at 0.05; * = significant at 0.1. 
Table 2. OLS Regression Results for Dependent Decision-Making Style.  
DV=Dependent I II III IV V 
Individualism 
(variable of interest) 
−0.152 
(0.003) *** 
−0.139 
(0.013) ** 
−0.141 
(0.011) ** 
−0.172 
(0.002) *** 
−0.169 
(0.002) *** 
Age 
  
−0.064 
(0.793) 
−0.081 
(0.741) 
−0.172 
(0.477) 
−0.178 
(0.462) 
GenderMale  
   
3.121 
(0.279) 
−0.197 
(0.946) 
0.135 
(0.964) 
USParticipant  
    
−11.692 
(0.001) *** 
−10.972 
(0.001) *** 
ReligionChristian 
     
3.888 
(0.291) 
Adjusted R-Squared 
 0.016 0.011 0.011 0.049 0.049 
F-Stat 
 
8.747 
(0.003) *** 
3.284 
(0.038) ** 
2.607 
(0.051) * 
6.407 
(0.001) *** 
5.351 
(0.001) *** 
N 469 425 424 424 424 
P-value in parentheses; *** = significant at 0.01; ** = significant at 0.05; * = significant at 0.1. 
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Table 3. Logit Regression of Country Location and Choice to Reveal Saboteurs. 
DV=Reveal I II III IV 
USParticipant  
(variable of interest) 
0.310 
(0.115) 
(0.387) 
(0.057) * 
0.494 
(0.020) ** 
0.520 
(0.018) ** 
Age 
  
0.021 
(0.227) 
0.021 
(0.252) 
0.021 
(0.269) 
GenderMale  
   
0.455 
(0.044) ** 
0.465 
(0.041) ** 
Religion: Christian 
    
0.134 
(0.633) 
% of cases correctly predicted 60% 59% 58% 58% 
N 446 417 416 416 
P-value in parentheses; *** = significant at 0.01; ** = significant at .05; * = significant at 0.1. 
Statistical analysis did not support H4a and H4b, indicating that there was no effect of individualist 
versus collectivist cultural context on the tendency to avoid decision-making. However, an individual’s 
country of residence emerged as a factor that affected the avoidance tendency. Individuals from Ghana 
were more likely to want to avoid making the vignette-based decisions altogether. 
Finally, H5 was tested to determine if the familiarity of the vignette setting had an effect on the 
decision to compromise with the company management and take an offer that met part but not all of 
the protesting group’s stated objectives. Participants were asked if the location of the vignette was 
similar to where they lived. Analysis showed that the coefficient for the familiarity of the cultural 
context did have the hypothesized effect and was significantly correlated to the decision to cooperate, 
remaining so when controlled by age, gender, country, and religion (p < 0.05). See Table 4 for a 
summary of the results. 
Table 4. Logit Regression Results for Similarity-of-Setting. 
DV=Cooperate I II III IV V 
LocationFeltSimilar 
(variable of interest) 
0.562 
(0.037) ** 
0.634 
(0.021) ** 
0.613 
(0.029) ** 
0.742 
(0.012) ** 
0.743 
(0.013) ** 
Age 
 
 
−0.044 
(0.049) ** 
−0.044 
(0.048) ** 
−0.038 
(0.092) * 
−0.039 
(0.059) * 
GenderMale  
 
  
0.060 
(0.797) 
0.128 
(0.596) 
0.130 
(0.588) 
USParticipant     0.357 (0.133) 0.364 (0.133) 
Religion: Christian     0.032 (0.916) 
% of cases correctly predicted 67% 67% 68% 67% 66% 
N 432 410 409 409 409 
P-value in parentheses; *** = significant at 0.01; ** = significant at 0.05; * = significant at 0.1. 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Analysis of the data collected in the U.S. and Ghana indicate that culture does indeed have an 
impact on decision making, showing indications of cultural impact across individual traits, societal 
traits, and conflict setting. First, the two hypotheses regarding personal traits were well-supported by 
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the data, indicating that cultural traits such as individualism and collectivism can have an effect on the 
general decision making style of individuals. Those who are more individualist tend to be more 
rational, and those who are more collectivist tend to be more dependent. This is an important finding 
for those who work in mediation and conflict resolution. When attempting to bring parties together to 
form an agreement, one ought to understand the cultural traits of the parties involved and tailor one’s 
approach accordingly. Our findings lead us to conclude that we ought not to expect collectivists to 
make long lasting decisions without the involvement of others in their group or individualists to toss 
aside the thoroughly researched and logical choice to go with a snap decision. 
Second, the nature of the society one lives in informs the decision making process. This study 
shows support for the third hypothesis that those from a collectivist society (Ghana) are more likely to 
prioritize interests of members of more central social identity groups by, in this case, not revealing the 
sabotage of associates. The country location emerged several times throughout the study as a relevant 
factor in determining decision making styles including rational, dependent, and in some cases avoidant 
thinking. This finding has particular relevance to peacekeeping operations. Preparation and training for 
peacekeeping missions should be built on an awareness of the cultural traits of the target society, and 
particularly on the central group identities informing the parties to the conflict. Our research suggests a 
tendency for collectivist societies to want to solve group problems within the most central and salient 
ingroup identities and a general reluctance to go to outer circles to find a solution. This potentially 
makes collectivist societies less prone to accepting external intervention, and is an area worthy of 
further research. 
Third and finally, our analysis indicates that the cultural setting of a situation can alter decision-making 
processes, but not in all cases. The nature of the conflict setting itself did not appear to have an impact, 
showing no support for the fourth set of hypotheses. However, the fifth hypothesis was supported, 
showing an effect of the feeling of familiarity to a conflict setting on the tendency toward peace. This 
may be an indication that it is advisable to deploy peacekeepers from collectivist societies to conflict 
settings in collectivist societies because their familiarity will aid their effectiveness. Similarly, 
peacekeepers from individualist societies should be sent to conflict settings in individualist societies. 
The importance of aligning cultural traits of peacekeepers with cultural traits of conflict societies needs 
to be explored more thoroughly in future research.  
While the survey method we used is effective for collecting large amounts of standardized data 
suitable for quantitative analysis, there is a minor limitation to the generalizability of our data because 
of the use of college students as previously discussed. However, this limitation did not prevent us from 
revealing the impact of culture on decision-making in our particular experimental setting. A further 
limitation of our approach is that the artificial nature of the questionnaire poses potential threats to 
validity. Having respondents self-report their perceptions measured in terms of responses to 
predetermined Likert-type statements limits the accuracy with which people can respond. However, by 
presenting all participants in a group with the same stimulus in a controlled setting, experiments and 
surveys allow for a level of standardization that is effective in eliminating most concerns for reliability. 
The field of international conflict theory has recognized the value of considering cultural variation 
in applications of conflict management such as cross-cultural negotiations and interactive conflict 
resolution, yet little research has been done to date to understand the implications of cultural variation 
on individual decision making processes. Decision theory has marginalized the impact of cultural 
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dimensions to the cognitive process, assuming that findings are universal to human behavior. 
Conversely, theories of ethnoconflict emphasize “local common sense”, or the implied cultural 
constraints in a society, which can be part of the unconscious cognitive processing. Understanding how 
local common sense plays into the decision-making process displayed during conflict situations can 
play a key role in effective conflict transformation efforts. 
The results of this research lead us to conclude that there are cultural constraints that have an effect 
on the decision making process. Consequently, the broader assumption often made in the literature that 
decision-making has universal characteristics must be tempered. The cultural traits of individuals as 
well as the general cultural characteristics of the society in which they live factor into the decision 
making process. This study has focused on quantitative measures attempting to reveal often 
subconscious factors such as one’s own traits and tendencies, the salience of one’s group identities, 
and the effects of where one lives. However, there is also likely to be important information in the 
conscious part of the decision-making process that could be discovered simply by asking people “why” 
they make certain decisions. Such a study would be able to reveal trends in justification factors and 
rationale that become salient when making decisions. This is a prime area for future research that 
could be used to begin building a conceptual model of the decision-making process in conflict 
situations from the point of view of cultural constraints. 
Further research is also warranted in other locations of the world. This study was limited to just the 
U.S. and Ghana in an initial cross-country comparison. Incorporating other countries that have 
similarities and differences in key cultural dimensions would allow for further comparisons and 
refinement of the conceptual model. In addition, conducting follow-on research on non-student 
populations within the same country would allow for an informative within-country comparison to 
highlight cultural differences between populations aside from the country location factor. For example, 
it would be useful to study the decision-making of a population experienced in the realm of 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution to compare with the typically inexperienced university student 
population. How does the conflict decision-making approach vary between these groups? What is the 
effect of professional experiences, for instance in the military or police, in a person’s decision-making 
process and outcome? Future research should investigate decision theory specifically in the context of 
conflict resolution practices, peacekeeping strategy development, and pre-deployment troop training to 
assess the extent to which individuals with different demographic, professional or identity 
backgrounds make decisions on whether to fight or to cooperate. Central to any such analysis is the 
need to gain a thorough understanding of the deeper effects of culture on cognitive processing and 
decision-making. Only through such studies will we be able to help in heeding Erick Barronodo’s call 
to the youth of Guatemala, and understand why some youth choose to pick up guns and knives and 
others do not. 
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Appendix A: Reduced Auckland Individualism Collectivism Scale (AICS) Questionnaire 
The following questionnaire is used to measure individualist and collectivist traits. Items are 
indicated with I or C to indicate they are part of the individualist or collectivist index respectively. 
Each question is implemented on a scale of strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or  
don’t know. 
1. I define myself as a competitive person. (I) 
2. Before I make a major decision I seek advice from people close to me. (C) 
3. I believe that competition is part of human nature. (I) 
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4. I consider my friends’ opinions before taking important actions. (C) 
5. I like to be accurate when I communicate. (I) 
6. It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas before making a decision. (C) 
7. I ask the advice of my friends before making career related decisions. (C) 
8. I sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group. (C) 
9. I prefer using indirect language rather than upset my friends. (C) 
10. I take responsibility for my own actions. (I) 
11. My personal identity independent of others is very important to me. (I) 
12. Winning is very important to me. (I) 
13. I see myself as “my own person.” (I) 
14. I consult my family before making an important decision. (C) 
Appendix B: Reduced General Decision Making Style (GDMS) Questionnaire 
The following questionnaire is used to measure general decision making styles. Items are indicated 
with an R, I, D, A, or S to indicate they are part of the rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant, or 
spontaneous index respectively. Each question is implemented on a scale of strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, strongly disagree, or don’t know. 
1. When I make decisions, I tend to rely on my intuition. (I) 
2. I rarely make important decisions without consulting other people. (D) 
3. When I make a decision, it is more important for me to feel the decision is right than to have a 
rational explanation for it. (I) 
4. I double-check my information sources to be sure I have the right facts before making decisions. (R) 
5. I make decisions in a logical and systematic way. (R) 
6. When making decisions I do what feels natural at the moment. (S) 
7. I like to have someone steer me in the right direction when I am faced with important decisions. (D) 
8. My decision making requires careful thought. (R) 
9. When making a decision, I trust my inner feelings and reactions. (I) 
10. When making a decision, I consider various options in terms of a specified goal. (R) 
11. I avoid making important decisions until the pressure is on. (A) 
12. I often make impulsive decisions. (S) 
13. I often need the assistance of other people when making important decisions. (D) 
14. I often put off making important decisions. (A) 
15. If I have the support of others, it is easier for me to make important decisions. (D) 
16. I generally make important decisions at the last minute. (A) 
17. I make quick decisions. (S) 
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